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Rankings upon Rankings – and no End in sight –  
discussion of “QuantitativE and QualitativE  
Rankings of scholaRs” by Rost and fREy
1  intRoduction
Katja Rost and Bruno S. Frey address an important topic. They compare two kinds of 
rankings, a conventional allegedly “quantitative” publication ranking, and a ranking based 
on the membership on editorial boards of academic journals, which they call “qualitative”. 
They find that the relation between the two rankings is not linear, but inversely U-shaped. 
Consequently, they argue that maximizing publication rankings may lead to a decline in 
research quality. Therefore, basing promotion decisions solely on publication rankings 
could be counterproductive for science and hence should be avoided.
The importance of Rost and Frey’s topic for the scientific community is indisputable, and 
the implied conclusion that promotion decisions should not be based solely on publica-
tion rankings is just as clear. But the importance and the conclusion are presumably the 
only points of consensus. The proposed new ranking, the empirical study, and the implicit 
assumptions on which their analysis is based are all controversial, and must be evaluated 
more critically. In what follows, I single out three points that I believe are to be seen crit-
ically: Are publication rankings rightfully called “quantitative”, given that rankings based 
on the membership on editorial boards are supposedly “qualitative”? Is the proposed new 
indicator “number of board memberships” better for research progress than the criticized 
indicator “number of publications”? Would it be better to refrain from rankings in general? 
Other authors might emphasize further points or perhaps choose entirely different ones, 
but such differing views are only natural, given the function of, and heavy discussions on, 
rankings. Since there will never be definitive answers, our objective can only be open and 
rational discussion. Therefore, I would first of all like to thank the Schmalenbach Business 
Review for having encouraged this discussion.
* Uschi Backes-Gellner, Professor for Business Economics, Personnel Economics and Empirical Research, Zurich 
University, Institute for Business Administration, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zürich, phone: + 41 44 6344281, 
e-mail: backes-gellner@isu.uzh.ch.
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2 aRE publication Rankings EvEn Rightfully callEd “QuantitativE”,  
givEn that Rankings basEd on thE MEMbERship on EditoRial boaRds  
aRE supposEdly “QualitativE”? 
The title of the essay suggests a comparison between quantitative and qualitative rankings. 
Therefore, we must first ask whether the new rankings proposed by Rost and Frey, which 
are based on the number of memberships on editorial boards, can rightfully be described 
as “qualitative”, given that rankings based on the (weighted) number of publications are 
described as “quantitative”. Is this even a true comparison of “quantitative” and “qualita-
tive” rankings? The answer is quite clearly “no”.
The act of counting alone suggests that both rankings are in fact quantitative. However 
each of the two rankings also indisputably contains qualitative aspects. In both rank-
ings, the indicators are “quantitative” in nature, but if they are well constructed, they 
also signify “quality”. Publication indicators always reflect quality if the number of publi-
cations is weighted based on journal quality (which should be the standard nowadays). 
Obviously, this is not a perfect way to depict quality. But then again, are indicators ever 
really perfect? The “new” indicator, which Rost and Frey call “qualitative”, is also simply 
a number. The “number” of memberships on editorial boards is clearly a quantitative 
indicator as well, and it is limited to measuring a single dimension. At the same time, 
the authors charge the allegedly “quantitative” publication rankings with not adequately 
considering the qualitative aspects of research activity. This accusation is certainly not new, 
and neither is it completely wrong, but it applies in just the same way to Rost and Frey’s 
so-called “qualitative” ranking. The number of board memberships is also a single dimen-
sion, and carries only limited quality information. In the end, nothing is perfect. Indica-
tors always depict certain dimensions better and others worse. The question of which of 
these dimensions are most important is still unanswered. Unfortunately, Rost and Frey 
do not provide an answer. 
To summarize, I can state at this point that the fundamental difference between “quanti-
tative” and “qualitative” does not exist in the way that the title of the paper of Rost and 
Frey suggests. Both indicators are simultaneously quantitative and qualitative, and both 
have their own specific advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, the relevant research 
question is not whether an indicator can depict all performance dimensions perfectly, but 
whether certain indicators, given their unique shortcomings, are more or less useful for 
the scientific community. In other words, an evaluation of alternative indicators should 
provide arguments to decide which indicator “causes less harm” or “has more benefits” to 
the scientific community. 
1 Rost and Frey do concede that “... quantitative and qualitative rankings are not strictly separable, since both con-
tain elements of the other. The distinction is made solely for clarity ...” (p. 64). However, throughout the rest of 
the text it does not prevent them from treating publication indicators as if they measured “quantity”, and as if 
number of board memberships measured “quality”.
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3 is thE pRoposEd nEw indicatoR, “nuMbER of boaRd MEMbERships”,  
bEttER foR thE sciEntific coMMunity than thE old indicatoR “nuMbER  
of publications”?
The notions of what purpose a ranking should or should not serve and what, exactly, a 
scientific community should accomplish are insurmountably different. Thus, there cannot 
be a definitive, conclusive answer to this question. But we can at least use some objec-
tive and generally applicable criteria for determining the quality of any performance indi-
cator to shed some light on the problem, namely we analyze an indicator’s scope for 
manipulation, its multitasking problems, and its potential for systematic distortions of 
results. These criteria should be fulfilled in every instance because otherwise, applying 
such performance indicators will inevitably cause biased or adverse incentives, which in 
turn would not be favourable to the scientific community as a whole. 
Scope for Manipulation
First, I compare the two indicators regarding the ease with which they can be manip-
ulated – i.e., the scope for manipulation – and the resulting distortion of incentives. A 
quick comparison of publication indicators and board membership indicators concerning 
the “scope for manipulation” raises doubts as to whether an indicator based on board 
memberships is a better indicator in this dimension. The question is, how easy is it to just 
raise the number of (weighted) publications without any, or with only very low cost, and 
how easy is it to just raise the number of board memberships? Is just increasing the indi-
cator cheaper for publications or for board memberships? Of course, a comprehensive 
analysis is not possible within the scope of this discussion paper. But I can provide some 
preliminary analyses to indicate how far the two performance indicators may be affected 
by manipulations of the agent (in this case, the researcher). In this context it is important 
to note that this problem becomes especially important ex post, i.e., once an indicator 
is known to be used for rankings. Some indicators may have yielded valid performance 
analyses historically, but the validity of the results is negated once the indicator is known 
to be used for rankings.
So what is the possible extent of a cheap manipulation regarding the number of publica-
tions or the number of board memberships, respectively? I would argue that the possibility 
of manipulating the number of publications is limited, at least for high-quality journals. 
High quality journals will always have a shortage of printing space. Hence, if a journal 
does not want to lose its reputation for quality, it must decide very carefully what to accept 
for print in the limited number of pages they have. Extending the number of journal pages 
2 Rost and Frey mention precisely the same criteria in part of their analysis, but they do not use them for a detailed 
comparison of the two indicators.
3 For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of various performance indicators for professors, see 
also Pull (2009). 
4 Rost and Frey argue that Scholars would invariably find ways to “beat the system”. This is undoubtedly true, but 
this makes it essential to ask which indicator allows the least possibility to “beat the system”. It seems unlikely 
that this indicator is the number of editorial board memberships as will be shown in the following.
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(i.e., extending the number of pages per volume or increasing the number of annual issues 
of a journal is usually not feasible, since it causes very high production costs and is an 
indicator of decreasing quality in and of itself. Consequently, journal editors will avoid 
allocating some of their already limited pages to a low-quality paper simply as a favour to 
some researcher (whether the author is a part of an editor’s network or not). So the costs 
of a manipulative publication decision (i.e., accepting a lower-quality paper for a favour) 
are extremely high because every bad paper takes up some of the already scarce space that 
could otherwise be used to print high quality papers. Thus the scope for manipulation is 
rather small, at least as long as publication indicators are quality weighted.
The situation is entirely different when we consider the scope for manipulation in the 
number of memberships on editorial boards. The list of board members can be extended 
almost at will without incurring any significant costs.  For whatever reason a journal 
would decide to add another researcher to their editorial board, they would just add 
another name to the list of board members. In the worst case scenario, the names of the 
board members would not fit on the front page anymore and the list would have to be 
continued on the second or third cover page, which causes only (if any) negligible addi-
tional production costs. And the potential loss in reputation caused by adding some more 
names on the front page (or perhaps even the second or third page) is certainly substan-
tially lower than the loss in reputation caused by a low-quality paper that is undeservedly 
accepted for publication. Hence, the direct and indirect costs of manipulating member-
ships on editorial boards are significantly lower.
However, it is important to note that Rost and Frey defend the quality of board member-
ships as an indicator by arguing that “A (chief ) editor wants to have scholars at hand who 
help him or her make the best possible decisions; a disreputable individual or person 
lacking expert knowledge is of little use”. But this argument is at least equally, and prob-
ably significantly more, valid for the decision on what papers to publish in a journal. What 
editor would want to publish a paper with obviously lacking quality? So if, as Rost and 
Frey suggest, the incentives of journal editors are correct for board memberships, then 
they should be at least as correct for publication decisions. In this respect, the two rank-
ings are not systematically different, but fundamentally similar.
As an easy and by no means final way to test this argument empirically, I compare the 
number of published papers with the number of editorial board members over the last few 
decades in one of the top journals in the management field, the Academy of Management 
Journal. The data and the graphs shown in Figure 1 and 2 cover the time span between 
1963 (the first available year in JStor) and 2010 (the last available edition).
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Figure 1:  Number of papers in AMJ per year
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Figure 2:  Number of editorial bord members AMJ
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Figure 1 shows that the number of papers has barely increased over the last 40 years, and 
that it fluctuates between 24 and 54 (cf. Figure 1). Figure 2 shows that the number of 
editorial board members increases continually, and towards the end, dramatically, begin-
ning with nine and ending with 159 (cf. Figure 2). This development is not necessarily 
due to manipulation, but at the very least it shows that there is great leeway in the number 
of board members.
If we also consider that according to Rost and Frey, the number of board memberships 
is first mentioned in 1991 as a performance indicator for researchers (Gibbons and Fish 
(1991)), the results are exactly what we would expect according to incentive theory and 
what I argued in the section above: the number of board members should begin to rise in 
the mid-1990s, at the very latest, while the number of publications should remain more 
or less constant.
5 I calculated the number of papers per year by multiplying the number of papers in the first issue of the year with 
the number of issues per year. Thus, the graph already accounts for the increase of issues per year from four to six 
in 1993. Here the reader should also note that the increase in issues per year does not lead to an increase in the 
total number of papers per year. 
6 I simply counted the number of editorial board members in each first issue of the year. Since the page listing the 
editorial board members is missing in the JSTOR-Version of issue 1/1973, I used issue 1/1974 in this case.
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Of course one could now argue that it is only difficult to manipulate the number of publi-
cations in top journals, or at least in high-quality journals. Given the increasing number 
of journals of somewhat questionable quality that have recently begun to be published, 
one might say that journal pages – and, consequently, the possible number of publications 
– are not really scarce anymore. This increase would imply that publication indicators 
have also developed more scope for manipulation over time. This claim is undoubtedly 
true, but well-constructed publication rankings weigh the number of articles according 
to journal quality for exactly this reason. Some rankings today even go so far as to entirely 
exclude low-quality journals in their publication counts. Others raise the convexity of 
the weights towards the upper limit of the journal quality (as it has just been done in the 
Journal Ranking for Economics Journals of the German newspaper “Handelsblatt”). 
Therefore, if we use the scope for manipulation as a way to determine the quality of a 
ranking indicator, the number of (weighted) publications is certainly a less problematic 
indicator than the number of board memberships.
MultitaSking probleMS
A second and important quality criterion for the two ranking indicators is the extent 
of multitasking problems, as already mentioned in Rost and Frey. Here, we must care-
fully compare the multitasking problems that evolve while publishing or while being a 
board member. So what are these other, multiple tasks, and is it reasonable to assume that 
the multitasking problems are higher for publication rankings as Rost and Frey suggest? 
According to Rost and Frey, the other tasks are “(...) teaching, supporting young scholars, 
informing and advising the public, participating in university administration, or reading 
and reviewing the work of other scholars.” Without conducting a comprehensive anal-
ysis, it is still obvious that Rost and Frey’s argument on why publication indicators cause 
multitasking problems also holds for board memberships. For instance, one of the prob-
lems of publication rankings that Rost and Frey identify is that “a publishing record is easy 
to measure, but performance on the other tasks is not”. This statement is just as true for 
the number of board memberships, because board memberships are also easier to measure 
than performance indicators of other tasks. Furthermore, attempts to maximize board 
membership counts often depend heavily on networking activities and on the establish-
ment of personal contacts. These activities certainly do not improve performance on the 
other tasks, such as teaching or supporting young scholars. On the contrary, the attempt 
to maximize publication counts is at least somewhat beneficial to other scientific tasks 
(for example, teaching senior students; see Backes-Gellner and Zander (1989), who find 
a positive correlation between teaching higher-level courses and publication output for 
economics and management professors in Germany). At the very least, maximizing publi-
cation counts leads to efforts to contribute to the current state of research. The same is 
hardly true for attempts to maximize personal networks.
7 Pull (2009) gives a more detailed discussion of multitasking problems when measuring performance of profes-
sors. 
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SySteMatic DiStortion of reSultS
In comparing the two indicators, we must also ask ourselves whether they systemati-
cally favour or discriminate against certain groups of scientists, or whether they are more 
likely to deliver unbiased results. Rost and Frey claim that “editorial boards clearly favour 
established scholars”, but that the same is true for “the number of publications and cita-
tions”. Unfortunately, the authors do not support this statement empirically. Personally, 
I would expect the opposite to be true. Younger generations have a fair chance of being 
published – even without a record – if their research is of outstanding quality. However, 
the membership on editorial boards clearly favours established scientists and leaves little 
chance for younger scholars, no matter how outstanding they may be.
This distortion is especially problematic in the context of producing research, because 
research progress and scientific innovations – like any other innovations – rely on new 
ideas and particularly on tapping the full potential of young talents.  Although I also 
cannot present hard empirical evidence, I will use an analogy to empirically support my 
argument, at least provisionally. I use a phenomenon that caused similar distortion and 
which was hardly beneficial for the scientific system. My example is presentations at scien-
tific conferences, which became accessible to young scholars only after the selection proc-
esses for accepting/inviting paper presentations, were aligned with the acceptance criteria 
used for papers in scientific journals. The presentations at the yearly conferences of the 
German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) are well documented and serve 
as an empirical example here. As late as the 1970s, there were only very few presentations. 
Selection decisions were made by a handful of established professors from a small pool of 
experts and colleagues who were all personally known to one another. Consequently, only 
very few researchers – all of them professors – ever had a chance to present their work. 
For instance, according to the annual conference proceedings printed in the book series of 
the German Economic Association, of the 19 speakers of the annual conference in 1970 
and the 34 speakers in 1982, every single one was a senior researcher. Young researchers, 
if they were permitted to attend at all, were only allowed to listen to the presentations, 
but not to present. Only after the Association opened part of the conference in the 1990s 
and based its choice of papers on an anonymous selection process did young scholars have 
a chance to present their work to the broader scientific community. Accordingly, in later 
years young scholars began to catch up. Between 1997 and 2002 at least 58% of speakers 
were young scientists with a diploma or Ph.D., while professors only made up about 20% 
of speakers (Fabel, Lehmann, and Warning (2003)). Today, the yearly conference of the 
German Economic Association would be inconceivable without all the young scholars 
in the open part of the conference – and scientific progress undoubtedly and to a large 
extent depends on this open part of the conference. Other examples for this phenomenon 
include the annual meeting of the German Association of Business Economists (Pfingstta-
gung des Hochschullehrerverbandes für BWL) and countless other conferences. Scientific 
progress would certainly not be able to keep up with the pace it has today if all of these 
8 Bommer and Ursprung (1998) also show that the presentation activities are significantly positively correlated 
with publication intensity. In other words, both studies show how much the scientific output now depends on 
young scientists. 
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conferences were still biased in favor of established scholars and against young scholars, 
as they were in the past.
interpretation of u-ShapeD relationShip between publicationS anD boarD  
MeMberShipS
Finally, the question remains, what we can conclude from Rost and Frey’s empirical results 
on the relation between publications and board memberships (given that their theoret-
ical arguments favouring board memberships over publications are rather unconvincing 
as shown above). So what do we learn from editorial board memberships and from the 
inversely U-shaped relationship Rost and Frey find?
Rost and Frey claim: “Journals are indeed interested to appoint board members who show 
a constant publication history but they are not interested in having board members who 
show a very large number of publications”. But the claim that journals are “not interested” 
in board members with very large number of publications is not supported by the available 
data. To be precise, the inversely U-shaped relationship only tells us that researchers who 
are outstandingly productive are less often members of editorial boards than researchers 
with lower publication productivity. It is unclear whether the outstandingly productive 
researchers have not been asked to participate in a board; or whether they preferred not to 
participate; or whether there is a trade-off regarding time investment, and that those who 
do participate in boards become less productive afterwards. As a matter of fact, we do not 
know whether the empirical results originate from the demand side, or from the supply 
side. Hence, Rost and Frey’s argument that journals are “... not interested in having board 
members who have a very large number of publications” is audacious. 
However, the good news in this context of an inversely U-shaped relation is that 
researchers with the lowest publication productivity are obviously the least likely to partic-
ipate in editorial boards. In the end, this result speaks to the quality of the editorial system 
as a whole – and as of today (and in this case, it is irrelevant whether scientists with low 
publication activity were not asked or simply did not want to participate, most important 
is that they just did not participate). 
what if eDitorial boarD MeMberShipS inDeeD becaMe a coMMon perforMance 
inDicator?
Last but not least, when evaluating the inversely U-shaped relation with respect to its 
consequences for the scientific community, we must ask whether it would even be an effi-
cient allocation of resources if outstandingly publishing researchers spent their time on 
more editorial boards, which could and – if incentives work as suggested by Rost and Frey 
– would happen if there were new and effective incentives for editorial board member-
ships. If we assume that the best research talents are particularly scarce, and if we further 
assume that research production and research services are substitutes for one another as 
Rost and Frey implicitly assume in their multitasking argument, then it seems doubtful 
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that a redistribution of efforts towards editorial board memberships would be a more effi-
cient allocation of resources. Incentives that stem from publication indicators encourage 
original research production, but at best board memberships only provide incentives for 
an intermediate output. Should this intermediate output become an end in and of itself 
due to misguided incentives, then membership on editorial boards could easily become 
a detriment to research productivity. In any case, before concluding from the inverted 
U-shape that there are distorting or inefficient incentives (in the upper part of the talent 
distribution) we need to further investigate the allocative problems in combination with 
the incentive effects at hand.
3 is it bEttER to REfRain fRoM Rankings in gEnERal?
Here I also see a clear “No,” because we (the business researchers community) would 
find ourselves back in the situation where we started more than 20 years ago: interna-
tionally backward, self-referential, and stuck in the past. This is the situation that first 
engendered the discussion about rankings in Germany, and when the first colloquia and 
papers on measuring research performance and its organizational determinants occurred. 
For instance, a group of (social) scientists at Schloss Reisensburg (cf. Fisch and Daniel 
(1986), Daniel and Fisch (1988)) tried to determine why German research output had 
become less and less visible over the years and why the distribution of individual research 
output was so uneven across researchers. They analyzed if a lack of objective performance 
measurement led to reduced incentives and declining research output; whether research 
performance was even measurable in general; and how,  based on international experience, 
a systematic measurement of research performance could (or could not) be implemented 
effectively. (For more information see also Backes-Gellner (1987), and Backes-Gellner 
and Moog (2003).) Given the situation at the time, the results of these discussions were 
clear and widely accepted: the lack of performance measurement did not automatically 
lead to great research success as those who criticized performance measurements some-
times seemed to suggest, but the existence of performance measurements did at least foster 
a minimum effort (of course without inhibiting maximum effort and great research). 
Instead, a lack of performance measurement led to virtually inexcusable differences in 
research output despite nearly identical input; it led to unwillingness to accept external 
criticism; and it led to complacency instead of the desire to continually improve. All these 
problems have been extensively described and discussed, and need not be repeated here. 
An obvious consequence of this discussion was an increased and shared understanding 
that research performance should, in principle, be measurable and that the profession as 
a whole would have to face up to the measurement of their performance – particularly as 
business economists, who spend a significant amount of their time on counting and eval-
uating the performance of others. 
Both the business economics profession and the scientific system as a whole (especially 
in the German-speaking countries) have come a long way since – and based on measur-
able results it was the right way to go. Today, young scholars are included as a matter of 
course at conferences; young German-speaking scholars are major contributors of papers 
in leading international journals; and appointments to professorships are predominantly 
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based on research output instead of on membership in “Old Boys Networks”, as was often 
the case in the past. Today, researchers expect to have their performance measured just 
like everybody else, and recognize that they cannot completely insulate themselves without 
consequences. In a world in which everything and everybody is measured and ranked, it 
is probably a virtue in and of itself that researchers also accept to be evaluated.
Perhaps, as happens so often when reforms are implemented, the current situation with all 
kinds of rankings being applied everywhere is too extreme. But this extreme result cannot 
mean that we need only revert to the old system and hope for everything to improve. It 
can only mean that we might need to be more careful, that we might need to differen-
tiate more precisely, that we might need to consider which rankings should serve which 
purpose, that we might need to weigh different rankings against one another, and that we 
might need to let one ranking complement the other. In this vein, Rost and Frey’s contri-
bution is highly laudable because it introduces a new indicator – membership in editorial 
boards – that certainly also generates valid information. However, I hope that this discus-
sion has shown that we should not see their indicator final word on rankings, nor should 
it even be perceived as “better” than publication rankings.
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